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Abstract Terrorism is a clear context of rapid change, greater
complexity and genuine uncertainties. A review of the events
that have been going on in Europe shows a great evolution of
the threat and the continuous emergence of new scenarios, like
those represented by “lone actors” and “foreign fighters”. The
complexity of the situation is due to the variety of quantitative
and qualitative factors involved. Uncertainty is a key charac-
teristic of our societies, generating fears that must be managed
by governments and security institutions. Before defining new
policies it is needed an analysis of the current situation of the
phenomenon and its possible evolution. Critical thinking,
loads of imagination, creative foresight and horizon scanning
methodologies would be the pillars of the research. Policies
are usually led by events and by social perception of risk. We
propose a holistic approach that integrates the lessons learned
from the past with modern foresight methodologies, intelli-
gence analysis, evidence-based policing, and decision-making
models. It is possible to manage our uncertainties in the
present, a time and a matter in which perhaps we feel lost,
but we must be sure that we are walking in a correct direction.
Keywords Counter-terrorism . Foresight . Policies . Future .
Europe . Intelligence . Creativity
Terrorist threats in Europe
Terrorism in Europe. A current picture
“Acute and diverse”, it is the expression used by Europol [1]
to describe the actual terrorist threat across Europe, but these
adjectives not only exist in future terms. We can describe the
complexity of current terrorist activity around ten facts that
define it.
Low-level conflicts and irregular warfare
The characteristics that define current conflicts where terrorist
groups even state-sponsored, urban guerrillas, rebels or
fighters determine the asymmetry of at least one of its parts,
have a dramatic impact on the local and regional security
environment, but the effects do not remain there. Even if none
of these scenarios take place within Europe today, the close-
ness regarding conflicts (Ukraine or Libya) requires an action
by EU members. This is another effect of the globalisation
process [2]. We cannot ignore that the world faces massive
and enduring tensions like population shifts, demographics
movements, natural resources shortage, global competition,
spread conflicts, modus operandi copycat or transnational
grievances, among others.
These challenges, no matter the way they may take, can
only be combated by actions: international cooperation, mil-
itary missions or international peacekeeping interventions,
which in the current geopolitical circumstances should not
be trivialised by EU members.
Increase of foreign fighters
Without underestimating the gravity of previous contexts as
Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, the current situation
of foreign fighters are marked by the Syrian scenario that has
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become the largest field of the jihadist battle so far [3] and is
acting as a lure to radicals from around the world. According
to data from the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation (ICSR) (April and December, 2013) during
the period between 2011 and early 2013 around 140–600
European fighters were displaced to Syria, and in the winter
of 2013 this number increased to 1100–1700 individuals.
Recent CIA data shows that this number could increase up
to 2.000 fighters.
Although it is not a new phenomenon, European concern
about the foreign fighters is increasing especially because of
the threat that the return to their origin places may bring. In
this direction we have several signals. One of the last was
made by the Heads of State and Governments of the European
Union on August 30th 2014, where they show a strong con-
cern about the current situation and “requests the Council to
review the effectiveness of the measures and to propose addi-
tional action, as required”.1 However, the risk that may
involve the return of these individuals to their origin places
has not been analysed deeply within Europe [4] only a few
researches about past plots exist like Sageman [5], Clarke and
Soria [6] or the dataset explained by Hegghammer [7]. But
still there are not studies on the implications, not only of their
“fight”, but also of those who are engaged in recruitment,
training, propaganda and communication activities among
others.
Homegrown terrorism
9/11 led to an unprecedented growth of violent activity in-
spired by radical Islamism and perpetrated by European citi-
zens’ descendants from immigrants, which have been called
the second and third generations, and Muslim converts. Even
when domestic terrorism is not a novel phenomenon, the
current development of terrorism, especially coming from
jihadist roots, has become a weapon of great destructive
power that threats Western interests and citizens and is gener-
ally associated with transnational socio-political grievances
[8]. As Europol [1] shows, Al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist
groups continued to encourage self-organized attacks within
the EU aiming for indiscriminate casualties.
Extremism and radicalization increased
According to the last Te-SAT Report from Europol, left-wing
and anarchist terrorism increased in number of attacks and
arrests. In the case of far-right groups it is becoming more
usual to show violent and intimidating behaviour, but they do
not usually use terrorist tactics.
The European Commission2 is concerned about activities
that are not only led by large organizations. Individual actions,
small cells or EU-based groups involve new and unpredictable
forms of action. And the results are not only the loss of lives or
economic damage; these episodes increase radicalization and
encourage extremisms across society. Europe is also directly
affected by global terrorism. Europeans could be victims of
attacks or perpetrators, recruiters or propagandists, fighters or
lone actors.
Individual terrorist actions
The phenomenon of individual terrorism is far from a modern
modus operandi but it is noticeable that there are new trends:
the adaptation process of new-style terrorist tactics helped by
the access to new technologies. However, despite the antiquity
of this problem, the increase in the number of cases, that still is
a marginal problem, is happening mainly in Europe [9].
Though the United States is the country with the largest
number of this kind of attacks, the secondmost affected region
is Europe, specifically Germany and the United Kingdom.
Also, if until 2010 individual jihadist terrorism had only taken
place in the US, in the last four years its effects also were
appreciated in the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden,
Norway, Canada, and Spain [10].
This context shows a latent need to adapt existing intelli-
gence mechanisms and prevention and detection security
measures.
Spread and adaptability of the modus operandi
In Europol words (2014), new tactics of several levels of
sophistication continue to be observed in all affiliations. But
it is not the only problem. The globalisation of the modus
operandi and its continuous adaptation to the new security and
prevention measures is becoming a silent real trend: an un-
usual combination of modalities and terrorist tactics with the
ability to transcend international public opinion and threaten
states through a single incident. This is a critical juncture
understood as the period of significant change, which normal-
ly happens in different ways depending on the country.
The internet as a terrorist tool
The internet has become an unwanted enhancer in its illicit
use, although it is recalled that its use by anyone involved in
security issues brings great benefits.
1 Special meeting of the European Council (30 August 2014), Brussels
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
144538.pdf
2 Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism:
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In 2013, RAND Corporation [11] conducted an investiga-
tion which, in an exploratory way, studied the role of the
internet use in 15 cases of radicalization, extremism and
terrorism that had been previously identified by UK Counter
Terrorism Units. The results of the study allowed confirming
the following assumptions: the internet increases opportuni-
ties and facilitates the process of radicalization, promotes
propaganda and begins to be a great recruitment tool.
In addition, UNODC [12] makes a classification of
the features that the internet actually provides to pro-
mote and support terrorism as a tool for: propaganda
(including recruitment, radicalization and incitement to
terrorism); financing; training; planning; execution; and
cyber-attacks.
Rise of trans-national terrorist groups capabilities
The problem is not only the growth of starring jihadist
terrorism, already present in territories like Mali, Algeria,
Mauritania, Niger, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and
Burkina Faso [13]. Phenomena such as the anarchist or
extreme right and left groups have international struc-
tures, resulting from the strong bonds between the dif-
ferent organizations, but also due to their ability to call
to action and act in third states.
The impact of terrorist intergroup cooperation
International terrorist alliances are a latent threat [14]. Their
existence contributes to increase opportunities for groups to
improve their operational efficiency [15] and lethality [16] as
well as it helps them to gain followers, provides a natural bridge
for the diffusion of tactical knowledge [17] or brings new
funding channels. Ultimately these alliances give them power
and ability to act when its structure is limited or threatened. The
existence of sanctuaries and safe havens in many parts of the
world contributes to this threat by providing meeting places for
terrorists. Places where they can design joint activities and seek
and obtain support while they are sheltered and even receiving
support from states that favour their cause.
It is a highly complex context in which the asymmetry of
the conflict does not necessarily mean that one of the two sides
lack sufficient potential to face the battle.
Links between terrorism, organized crime and corruption
This is an obstacle of enormous complexity. Facing a
problem in which three independent variables are inter-
related, potential negative outcomes are multiple. Terror-
ism, organized crime and corruption are evident in many
fragile states like Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria (Fragile
States Index, 2014) and this is not a problem far away
from Europe.
The EU Anti-Corruption Report3 published by the Euro-
pean Commission in March reflects a substantial increase
across the region. In the Commission’s words, it is “breath-
taking” and entails a cost of at least 120bn euros per year. In
the organised crime case the trend is similar. A recent Europol
study [18] shows that criminal groups, over 3.600 currently
active in Europe, have growing networks, transnational oper-
ation capacity, higher mobility and great diversification of
activities. The cost of this scourge only in business terms is
estimated at more than €670 billion annually within the EU.
Large social forces like economic inequality, unem-
ployed youth population or austerity policies [19] may or
may not have consequences. The ability to impact of these
three variables together can be greater than we expect.
Counter-terrorism measures. A critical overview
of the European framework
The EU legislative career in counter-terrorism was first taken
seriously after the attacks of 9/11. Until then it had never
designed or implemented any measures by EU members as a
whole. However, despite the on-going initiatives as developed
by SECILE [20] there is still no focus repository and catalogue
of all these measures.
Early years of EU counter-terrorism cooperation were fo-
cused primarily on the “prevent” and “disrupt” elements of the
EU strategy. It was seven years ago when the trend changed
taking priority “action” and “protection”. A bleak picture
which imposes two dimensions of action over two different
ones equally important.
A brief timeline is presented below indicating the major
counter-terrorism actions undertaken by the EU in order to
develop a critical view of the current situation (Table 1).
Starting from the initial situation that has been
displayed, the current issues in terrorism matters, and with
reference to this framework, make it difficult to assure the
existence of a counter-terrorism strategy or if it is a
cosmetic arrangement.
– As can be seen on the timeline, the impact of 9/11
represented an unprecedented growth of European coun-
terterrorism agenda. The instinctive reaction of govern-
ments of the EU was to include as much justice and
security measures as possible under the premise of fighting
terrorism [20]. As Romano Prodi, former President of the
European Commission, said jokingly: Osama bin Laden
3 EU Anti-Corruption Report. Report from the Commission to the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament. Brussels. 2 March, 2014 http://ec.
europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-
crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf
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did more for the development of European counterterror-
ism and home affairs cooperation than Jean Monnet.
– In the same line it is observed that any urgency to deal with
terrorism is performed once its effects are felt. Jihadist
terrorism, al-Qaeda, individual terrorism, ISIS, foreign
fighters, homegrown terrorism, every “new phenomenon”
seems to swallow all previous problems and start to be the
importance centre. The problem is when this tendency to
act “following news” comes from the field of research and
legislation and from the decision-makers. Listening these
days, from members of European governments, the possi-
bility of treating citizens as terrorists who are getting
involved in conflicts abroad, or the intention to revoke
citizenship to them, are some of these examples, born out
of urgency and proposed without evaluation or criteria.
– The actual counterterrorism agenda with a huge number
of measures, over 260, some unrelated, sometimes over-
lapping, not only makes very complex its study by the
academic community but also its practical application.
– These more than 260 measures, many of which cannot be
understood in isolation, circumstance which greatly hin-
ders their development, inspire little confidence not only
on the security forces from different countries who need
minimum guarantees for the performance of their duties.
It also downplays the damage suffered by the fundamen-
tal rights of citizens. Security is becoming the main
objective, when it only should be a mean to ensure the
exercise of civil rights and liberties.
– Despite the recent enlargements of the mandate and pow-
ers of the European Commission in these areas, their
functions are still very limited. These decision-making
bodies are suffering a “democratic deficit” and when they
are given more power they just stumble frontally with the
governments of the member states which do not allow
large intrusions into their security agendas.
– These concerns on democratic control of the Council of the
EU and its strategies, and its counter-terrorism agenda, are
increasing the distrust generated by the growing involve-
ment of industry security and defence policy in many
newly developed measures.
– In fact, there is neither monitoring nor a regular evalua-
tion of the actions that are being developed. Even more,
the implementation of the measures for each country is
individual and the effects, costs or benefits are measured,
in the best case, in local terms.
The future of terrorism in Europe (2030)
Methodological framework
We have applied the analytical framework used by RAND
Europe in its research “Europe’s Societal Challenges. An
analysis of global societal trends to 2030 and their impact on
the EU” [21], that is consistent with the Development, Con-
cepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) report of the UKMinistry
Table 1 EUCTMeasures (Cohen and Blanco 2014) *(Measures quantified according to the type of instrument used by the EU to implement them and
the counter-terrorism area of impact)
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of Defence (2010), titled “Global Strategic Trends out to
2040” [22].
We selected the trends observed trough a literature
review process owing to the fact that we believe it
necessary to study the phenomenon of terrorism within
the social context (with all variables that it entails) in
which it runs. Using the same documents and helped by
experts meetings in the headquarters of the Centre of
Analysis and Foresight (CAP) of Guardia Civil (Spanish
Law Enforcement Agency) we identified their drivers
(factors that influence or causes change) indicators and
those outcomes that could be related to terrorism, that
could act as causes or factors, and produce threats and
risks, according to the existing lists in “The Routledge
Handbook of Terrorism Studies” [23].
A trend is a set of processes that cannot be changed easily, a
discernible pattern of change. They were born, have been
pushed or depend on the present and will continue in the
future. A driver is an agent or factor which drive a change
forward and the indicators are the different variables that
explain it.
In our process, which follows partially the model of
Lia [33] for the study of the future of terrorism, we
have selected political, economic, social, technological
and environmental trends, based on the following
sources:
– “Europe’s Societal Challenges”. RAND Europe [21].
– “Global Strategic Trends out to 2040”. DCDC [22].
– “Global Risks 2013” [24] and “Global Risks 2014” [25].
World Economic Forum.
– “Global Trends 2030”. National Intelligence Council [26]
– Internal documents of the CAP, Guardia Civil, based on a
general literature review about the future, and the selec-
tion of the main trends about the future with a PESTEL /
SWOT model.
For each trend we assign a degree of evidence (high: ***;
medium: **; low: *), and a degree of uncertainty about the
outcomes (H: high; M: medium; L: low).
Trends, drivers and indicators, although there are
specific mentions to the EU or Europe, must be global,
because they involve more than a country or a region.
Events occurring on one part of the world can affect
and be affected by events occurring in other parts. The
process of globalisation is a continuous and permanent
megatrend that affects politics, economics, social
change, or technological development.
Trends, drivers, indicators and outcomes
Political trends (Table 2)
Economic trends (Table 3)
Social trends (Table 4)
Technological trends (Table 5)
Environmental trends (Table 6)
Megatrends, game changers and wild cards
A conclusion appears to be clear: international terrorism
will persist, and needs to be faced with all our efforts
and imagination. An asymmetric threat needs asymmet-
ric measures.
Some of the identified trends offer a high degree of
evidence, being megatrends, trends that are very proba-
ble to happen (i.e. demographic evolution). Other trends
and outcomes could affect in a positive or a negative
way the phenomenon of terrorism, we call them “game
changers” (i.e. technology). Following those trends and
outcomes, and applying them to the research on terror-
ism, we could think on a future with the following
characteristics (Table 7):
Those risks with low probability (because of the high
competencies or resources needed to plan and execute an
attack, historical trends, or incidents that go beyond our imag-
ination) and high impact (because they generate terror, casu-
alties, or dangers) are what we call “wild cards”. Different
from those called as “known unknowns”, the things we know
will happen although we do not know exactly when or what
effects will result.
There is a key factor that could act as a “game chang-
er”: counter-terrorism policies, that, as we argue, it is not
possible to know if act as a pull, a push, or a neutral
factor because the EU does not follow an evidence-based
policing system.
In conclusion, there are several difficulties with un-
certainty, complexity and change dynamics. So, the
methodological effort would try to combine positive
knowledge about future trends with intransparency.
Game changers could be managed through a monitoring
system of information, analysing the evolution of each
one. Wild cards are impossible to detect, are incontrol-
lable. We deal with the distinction between a “present
future” and a “future present”. Esposito (2011) [27],
following the sociological systems theory of Niklas
Luhmann, points out that the past and the future include
a multiplicity of past and future presents. Even if the
world is unknown, one still has a known and acceptable
orientation about the future. We know emerging trends
that could be consolidated in the future, and we know
events (elections, demography evolution) and technolo-
gies that will be points of change. It is possible to get a
methodological vision of “present future”, through
trends analysis, horizon scanning or other techniques
(tools to understand the future, but not scientific
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methodologies). But we do not know what will happen,
the information is limited, “both concerning the behav-
iour of others who are oriented to us and also
concerning the future that will result from our choices”,
so we have the opportunity to revise this “present
future” in the continuous “future presents”. Esposito,
in this situation, thinks that time is a great opportunity
and allows for imagination and creativity.
Table 3 Economic trends and security outcomes (Cohen and Blanco 2014)
TRENDS DRIVERS INDICATORS E TIME OUTCOMES U




** S/M Social unrest; inequality; populism
and extremism; radicalization;
ghettos and minorities




and between rich and
poor countries




Income indexes; Gini index;









(GDP); social budget evolution
*** S/M H




** S/M/L More opportunities M
Table 2 Political trends and security outcomes (Cohen and Blanco 2014)
TRENDS DRIVERS INDICATORS E TIME OUTCOMES U
Crisis of power Obama doctrine: “Leading from
behind”; growing impact of
nonstate actors; crisis of the power
of nations; new international
balance of power; multi-polar
world and diffused power; post
western period; lack of EU inter-
national leadership; WMD prolif-
eration; world processes of
democratisation.
Global Peace Index (GPI); Fragile
States Index (FSI); inequality gaps
between countries; power indica-
tors (GDP, military power, etc.)
** S/M/
L
Global governance failure; anarchy;
failed and weak states; corruption;
organized crime; terrorism; long






EU surrounded by unstable regions
(Middle East, North of Africa);
military participation of EU
countries; peacekeeping
operations; War on Terrorism.
GPI; FSI; presence of European
countries troops in conflicts
** S/M/
L








Press Freedom Index, Civil Rights
Index, Democracy Index








devices; internet; social media;
activism and cyber activism; new
ways of participation; pressure for
democratic reforms; transnational
mobilizations; voters rejecting
established political parties; low
trust in politics
Number of political platforms
online; new social movements; e-
government index; transparency
index; open data index; Democ-
racy index; Civil rights index
*** S/M Social conflicts; leaks; changing






Security concerns about privacy and
cyberspace; legal systems of
control
E-government and open data
indexes; sentiment analysis
output; proliferation of leaks
** S/M Multi surveillance from the states









Declining trust in institutions;




EU elections results; national
election results; number of
terrorist attacks or incidents;
confidence in institutions surveys.
*** S/M Social unrest; political violence;
terrorism; narratives that aim to
conquest Al Andalus
H
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Table 4 Social trends and security outcomes (Cohen and Blanco 2014)
TRENDS DRIVERS INDICATORS E TIME OUTCOMES U
Global population
growth
Growing life expectancy; growing
fertility in developing countries








Growing life expectancy; high
fertility rates; less infectious
diseases; elderly citizens;
increasing in one single person
ways of life; new forms of
cohabitation; youth bulges on
parts of the world
Fertility rates; life expectancy; % of
single parent households; divorce
rates; average households size;
poverty by household; old age
dependency ratio, health care




Risks of poverty and social
exclusion; migration to the EU;
social unrest; pressure for








Fertility rates; population growth;




Migration to the EU; pressure for
democratic reforms; decreasing
political EU influence; social
unrest
L
Migrations Diversity in migration flows;
attractiveness for migrants:
economic and employment
opportunities; social and family
networks; rights and liberties;
attitudes to migrants; residential
distribution of migrants;
conflicts; second and third
generations integration;
“diaspora” communities









Cultural polarization; problems of
integrations; ethnic and religious
conflicts; stress to social welfare;
racism; skill gaps for job access;
ghettos; lack of opportunities;
extremisms and radicalization;






values and ways of life; internet
and social media; growing
middle class
Gross domestic consumption; luxury
industry trends; Democracy
index; Civil rights index
** S/M Inequality; grievances; terrorist
narratives based on western way






globalization of travel and
transports and mobility








Better education, health and wealth Human Development Index *** M/L High variations in the EU;





Internet; social media, networks;
education online; information
and knowledge society
Internet and social media use *** S/M New opportunities, but terrorist
opportunities too in
communication and recruitment:
loner terrorism, foreign fighters
H
Table 5 Technological trends and security outcomes (Cohen and Blanco 2014)









analysis of impact of
new technologies in
security






Big Data and predictive
systems








*** S/M/L New opportunities to understand and
study matters like terrorism. Privacy:










analysis of impact of
new technologies in
security
*** S/M/L Push and pull factors for terrorist use
and for a counter-terrorism use. Dual
use civil and military and possibility
of access by terrorist groups. Gap
between legislation and technology.
Privacy
H
Smart cities Technologies; social and
political change and
trends; internet of things
Smart cities index *** S/M/L Cyber threats; critical infrastructures
targets
H
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Table 6 Environmental trends and security outcomes (Cohen and Blanco 2014)
TRENDS DRIVERS INDICATORS E TIME OUTCOMES U
Growing resources demand Cultivation; new technologies;
economic and population
growth; urbanization degree;
food, water and energy scarcity
Prices of resources (oil,
minerals, food);
international conflicts





Climate change Determining the direct effect of
climate change in natural




Pandemics Urbanisation; globalisation; travels Evolution of incidents * S/M/L H
Natural catastrophes Floods, volcanos, earthquakes,
tsunamis
Evolution of incidents * S/M/L H
Table 7 Terrorism in Europe 2030 (Cohen and Blanco 2014)
FUTURE TERRORISM DRIVERS Probability Impact
Low intensity conflicts, or small wars.
Irregular warfare
The absence of a clear international leadership, the multi-polar distribution of power,
the weak and late response of the US or the EU to emerging conflicts, the existence
of radical religious ideologies, and the fragility of several states could provide the
terrorist organizations the opportunity to have safe havens to recruit, train, and
control partially some states. The proximity to the EU or the action of the states of the
EU could be factors affecting the risk
H H
New terrorist safe havens Conflicts, weak states, terrorist mobility, foreign fighters M M
The merge between terrorism and
transnational organized crime (TOC)
Urbanization, fragile and collapsed states, corruption, financing needs, weapons
trafficking, false documents trafficking, drug trafficking, human beings trafficking,
natural resources trafficking
H M
Terrorist use of the internet The cyberspace will be another battleground of terrorism, a marketplace of ideas, a way
of communication, recruitment, financing, buying resources, terrorising
H M
Cyberterrorism Technological development, smart cities, interconnected critical infrastructures M H
Terrorist use of new technologies Technological development, individual empowerment, internet, social media, M H
Armies of terror Foreign fighters, big armies associated to Shia and to Sunni worlds, internet and social
media, fragile states as objective
H M
Individual terrorism The process of individual empowerment, internet and social media, the knowledge
society, “leaderless resistance” principles.
M M
Homegrown terrorism Migration to the EU, lack of opportunities, grievances (political, social, ideological,
cultural, or economic), and the integration of second and third generations
M M
Rise of extremism: religious, right-wing,
left-wing. Radicalization
Globalization, urbanization process, corruption, international conflicts, the existence of
“ghettos”, migration to the EU, the acceptance of migrants, the integration of second
and third generations of immigrants, the cultural polarization, economic and social
inequalities
H M
Rise of trans-terrorism networks. Trans-
versal bridges between groups
Globalization, transports, internet, social media, foreign fighters networks,
multiactivism, diffuse ideologies, relationships between different international
groups, unexpected “marriages of ideologies”, organized crime
H H
New ways of action Globalisation of terror. Kidnappings, small arms, soft targets, urban jihad, or dramatic
actions used in Syria or Iraq
M H
Access to weapons of mass destruction Growing proliferation, fragile states, conflicts L H
Anarchism Diffuse leadership, inequality, anti-capitalism values, proliferation of social unrest,





War on Terrorism. International and regional alliances. Conflicts. Humanitarian crisis
and human rights violations. Peacekeeping operations
H M
Soft targets Cultural gaps, narratives anti-western way of life, market orientation and privatisation
of the power, business targets of anti-globalisation, anarchist or jihad groups
M H
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New counter-terrorism policies in contexts of change,
complexity and great uncertainty
Intelligence analysis with creativity and imagination
The report about 9/11 [28] stressed in a chapter devoted to
prospective analysis (“Foresight and Hindsight”) that the lack
of imagination was the major mistake when trying to prevent
the terrorist attacks. Imagination is not common in bureaucra-
cies. Policy-makers have a short horizon, but policies should
not.
Some authors highlight the obsession for collecting
data [29]. The so called “Big Data” is a revolution
because it is a source of development that allows man-
aging huge amounts of information and applying predic-
tive techniques. When studying the phenomenon of ter-
rorism or analysing intelligence, this obsession for details
can let us know what is going on, but not its causes or
the most appropriate measures to be implemented. In the
best-case scenario, we can guess that some event will
probably happen in the future, or we can compare pat-
terns, but it does not guarantee that the future will be
that way [30]. In addition, if analysts get used to having
every possible detail before making a diagnosis, this
might result in an excessive dependence that might lead
to paralysis.
Unknowns unknowns, a famous concept developed by
Donald Rumsfeld, are perhaps impossible to manage. Taleb
creates the concept of “antifragility”, a way to manage uncer-
tainty (wild cards or black swans) but not trying to identify
them previously, but being prepared to be stronger in this
evolutionary and complex systemwhen events with low prob-
ability happen. This concept goes over the resilience theories
(Wildavsky, Douglas).
According to the 9/11 Commission Report “it is therefore
crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the
exercise of imagination”. Richard Clark (National Counter-
terrorismCoordinator, NSC, 1997–2001) attributed his aware-
ness about the possible use of airplanes as weapons more to
Tom Clancy novels than to warnings from the intelligence
community.
Imagination is needed to identify attackers, to discover
vulnerabilities, to think about a new modus operandi in ter-
rorist attacks, to connect the dots (one of the key functions of
intelligence analysis), to preview scenarios, to establish hy-
pothesis to evaluate, to suggest different alternatives, to have
different points of view, and to develop new ways and new
processes of analysis. Imagination is, sadly, a non-used source
of information.
Finding atypical observations, the “dots”, could be
the first step in an intelligence process based on
creativity. These observations could be originated by
the knowledge of rare events, or changes in classical
patterns of terrorism. But this information could not
only be based on existing data, information or events.
It could be possible to create information based on a
creative thinking process following some of the multiple
methodologies that pursue this aim. Once we have iden-
tified a possible “dot”, we propose the use of the
Atypical Signal Analysis and Processing (ASAP) con-
cept developed by the RAND National Security Re-
search Division (NSRD) [31].
Foresight as a continuous system
Policy-makers take counter-terrorist measures without objec-
tive analysis systems, mainly responding to opportunity or
social alarm triggered by some event, and without designing
future scenarios that will never take place during their term of
office.
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism [32]
developed an important research analysing the refer-
ences to the future evolution of this phenomenon in
60 surveys conducted by well-known institutions and
experts. This survey reaches a conclusion: most of them
lack a methodological basis; in general, they do not
even mention possible dynamics of change that would
allow establishing indicators to monitor the evolution of
the phenomenon.
In the best-case scenario, these surveys are a goodwill
gesture based on personal opinions, intuition based on expe-
rience or trend forecasting.
Lia [33] points out that the literature about the future of
terrorism lacks a systematic way of thinking on how social
change creates new environments for terrorism. Normally
individual events or cases are used and extrapolated, but no
analysis is carried out on the evolution of those factors deter-
mining the environment where terrorism can increase or be
tackled.
Among the different attempts to create such a model,
Brynjar Lia’s deserves special attention. The main ad-
vantage of this proposal is that it defines a framework
to analyse the environment regarding the potential
socio-political changes enabling the evolution of
terrorism.
Lia basically mentions that there are factors such as
international relations (leadership, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, democratisation, fragile
states, multilateralism, peace support interventions, non-
governmental actions), economic factors (inequality, re-
lationship between economy and politics, organized
crime, energy), demographic factors (growth and
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migrations), ideologies and technologies that would allow
identifying the causes of terrorism and predicting the future
(target patterns, terrorism level, deadliness, ideological moti-
vations, geographical location, etc.). A similar model is the
one we used in the second epigraph of this paper.
Foresight research, papers or books are static informa-
tion. When we must address risks with rapid change and
high uncertainty, the efforts must be continuous. Fore-
sight must be a permanent system because terrorism is an
evolutive concept. Trends are continuously evolving.
Drivers and indicators need to be continuously evaluated.
Decision-making process
Evidence-based counter-terrorism policy is widely understood
as a historical search for usable and relevant knowledge gen-
erated through rational scientific methods to help address and
resolve terrorism-related problems, to produce knowledge
required for fine-tuning programs and constructing guidelines
and toolkits for dealing with known problems.
The centre of policy evidence-based should be to evaluate
if counter-terrorism policies work and fix the way we could
measure it. But our aim would be broader. It would be, at the
end, to design a holistic approach, a model, in order to assure
that policing designers had the best knowledge and the best
intelligence when they take decisions on counter-terrorism.
For this purpose, we distinguish three phases, but each of
them is formed by too many processes:
a) Before policing. The decision-maker must have access to
the best possible information. Knowledge about terrorism is
fragmented and elaborated by different actors (university,
think tanks, intelligence analysts, government civil servants,
lobbies, citizens’ desires and needs, etc.), and we must join
them. We must evaluate the results of this process, in order
to know if it works, and to propose an integral framework of
knowledge and intelligence for policy makers.
b) Taking decisions or policing. We must know how a
policy-maker acts. There are many researches about it
that we could apply to the process: studies about
individual factors, cognitive biases, group factors,
public policy theories, and intelligence led policing.
We must evaluate this process in order to know the
causes of a bad decision (for example, when the
decision-maker does not follow the analysts’ advice).
It is important to go ahead classical models, as the
rational model of decision-making. Policy-makers are
not absolutely rational, so we must consider the use of
incremental models [34] or less rational models like
the multiple stream approach [35], the discrediting
decisions of Weick, or the mixed scanning model of
Etziani that combines a high policy-making process
with basic directions and fundamental decisions and
incremental ones that consider past policies and pre-
pare for fundamental decisions and manage them after
they are approved [36]. These models should be com-
pleted with new visions, under construction, based on
networks and collective intelligence.
Fig. 1 Holistic process for Counter-terrorism policy-making (Cohen and Blanco 2014)
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c) After policing. Policies generate effects that must be
measured, but not only with rational indicators (arrests,
number and cost of attacks, time between attacks). If
causing terror is the main objective of terrorism, we
should measure fear and terror, and other social impacts
of counter-terrorism policies (i.e. loss of civil liberties).
This process not only aims to know the effectiveness of
the policies, but also to improve future policy making.
A new methodological approach to the study of terrorism
and decision-making
Therefore, the model we propose, a holistic approach [37],
integrates at least five individual models: a new intelligence
process, the decision-making process, the “connecting the
dots” model of RAND Corporation, evidence-based policing
and foresight. The pillars of this holistic approach are:
a) Need to focus on intelligence surveys, analyses and ac-
tions on answering the question “what for?”. Decision-
making is the major goal, at strategic, tactical and opera-
tional levels.
b) The intelligence process must satisfy, as a main objective,
the need to “connect the dots”, answering the require-
ments established to inform the decision-making process.
c) The sources of those different “dots” are data, informa-
tion, imagination and creative thinking, and homeland
security observations (i.e. previous knowledge, or intui-
tion based on experience).
d) There are multiple stakeholders that could help to create the
best knowledge and intelligence in order to take actions,
design strategies, or make plans. Think tanks, universities,
experts, and citizens should be an important part of that
process. It would be useful to integrate the synergies
among academic studies about intelligence and terrorism.
e) A new intelligence process, with the support of modern
information technologies, modifying and eliminating the
classical cycle of intelligence. This process is not based on
a lineal and continuous cycle, but on the use of different
tools like scanning, monitoring, information classification
and evaluation, integration, analysis, dissemination or vi-
sualization of information, which are not sequential stages.
f) Time perspective. We shape the future through the deci-
sions we make in every moment. Expectations about the
future introduce causal factors in it, and they also condi-
tion our decisions at present. But our past (experiences,
education) creates our present too. Consequently, we can
state that these three moments overlap. The model intro-
duces considerations about non-linearity of time, path
dependency and multi-causality.
g) The integration of every applicable methodology, from a
holistic time-based perspective. From a methodological
point of view, it would start from the scientific method
and social sciences, incorporating the structured tech-
niques of intelligence analysis, and even including Big
Data or the futures studies.
h) As the model regards strategic and operational aspects,
the use of global systems and models would allow
supporting early warning systems. The starting point
would be using methodologies such as Environmental
Scanning and Horizon Scanning.
i) Finally, the model incorporates the theory of evidence-
based policing, evaluating different processes: the re-
quirements or needs of intelligence, the intelligence pro-
cess developed by analysts and their managers, the
decision-making process, and the effects of the CT strat-
egies (efficiency, costs, impacts in citizens and other non-
desired effects) (Fig. 1).
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